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Abstract
This paper aims at clarifying the report between the President and the Constitutional 
Court. If we take as a starting point the constitutional mandate of these two institutions 
it follows that their final mission is the same, i.e., the protection and safeguarding of 
the constitutional system. This paper, thus, will clarify the key points in which this 
report is expressed. Further, this paper examines the theoretical aspects of the report 
between the President and the Constitutional Court, starting from the debate over 
this issue between Karl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen. An important part of the paper will 
examine the Constitution of Kosovo, i.e., the contents of the constitutional norm and its 
application. The analysis focuses on the role such report between the two institutions 
has on the functioning of the constitutional system. In analyzing the case of Kosovo, 
this paper examines Constitutional Court cases in which the report between the 
President and the Constitutional Court has been an issue of review. Such cases assist 
us in clarifying the main theme of this paper. Therefore, the reader will be able to 
understand the key elements of the report between the President as a representative 
of the unity of the people on the one hand and the Constitutional Court as a guarantor 
of constitutionality on the other hand.
Keywords: President; constitutional court; unity of the people; constitutionality; 
constitutional system.
Introduction
The Constitutional and factual report between the President as a chief of state and 
the Constitutional Court has been a subject of debate for long. This debate, containing 
conflicting ideas and thoughts has culminated in the 30’s of last century and is largely 
attributed to the authors Karl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen. The key question of this debate 
centered on the idea of who should be the guardian of the Constitution? At the time, 
this debate focused on the Constitution of Weimar1.
1 Stockholm Institute for Scandianvian Law; Stanley L. Paulson; Some Issues in the Exchange between Hans Kelsen and Erich 
Kaufmann, 2010, page 2.
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This paper will examine the theoretical views over the report between the President 
as a representative of the unity of the people and the Constitutional Court as a 
safeguarding institution of the Constitution and of constitutionality. The paper focuses 
on the constitutional system of Kosovo, as a new system, created in conformity with 
the highest standards of a democratic state and adopting western values.2 This report 
between two of the most important constitutional institutions, which together 
embody the duty of guaranteeing the democratic functioning of state institutions 
could be examined from different viewpoints and places, however in this case, this 
paper is limited in the Republic of Kosovo.
As stated above, every reader and author on this topic, cannot avoid the debate 
of the last century between Schmitt and Kelsen, as such this debate cannot be left 
aside without commenting upon, before we analyze the Constitution of Kosovo, as 
concerns the the theme of this paper. On the one hand, Hans Kelsen’s theory is a pure 
legal theory and not political whereas on the other, Karl Schmitt’s thoughts have a 
pure political nature, based on the fact that Schmitt thought that the protection of 
the Constitution is best achieved when done by the President of the Reich. Despite 
that the majority of Schmitt’s concept revolves around and is dominated by political 
elements, nonetheless, this concept is also important in the legal aspect even though 
all of Schmitt’s arguments on this debate are political.3
Kelsen, on the other hand, disputes Schmitt’s ideas, by opposing the presence of 
political elements in judicial decisions. As David Dyzenhaus has pointed out, “Kelsen’s 
strategy was an instance of liberal recognition of the reality of politics and the way 
that decision breaks through the normative, at the same time as it is a futile and 
purely formal attempt to contain that breakthrough”.4 Among others, we have to 
keep in mind that even though this debate has taken place in the last century and 
in a political reality which is not the same as in our time, thus this debate should not 
be considered only from a historical viewpoint, but also from a judicial viewpoint. 
Moreover, we should analyze the thoughts from this debate based on the current 
realities that exist among different constitutional systems.
In the context of this debate, Schmitt argues that the President, in addition to exercising 
the competences afforded to him, he represents the unity of the people, thus the 
President for reasons of moral prestige and the general trust, shall have a unique 
authority in the state. This moral position of the President empowers his neutral force 
2 The Constitution of Kosovo has been approved on 09 April 2008 and entered into force on 15 June 2008, and is considered the 
establishing act of the state of Kosovo and its new constitutional order, after an international supervision of over eight years 
under the administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK.
3 Luis Pereira Coutinho, Massimo La Torre, Steven D. Smith; Judicial Activism – An Interdisciplinary Approach to the American and 
European Experiences; Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice; Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, 
2014, page 89.
4 Ibid. 88-89
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in a system of checks and balances. Moreover, according to Schmitt, the President of 
the Reich is equipped with competences that make him an independent “neutral” 
from the legislative power.5 Pursuant to this and to these arguments, Karl Schmitt, in 
response to Hans Kelsen’s theory, would argue that only the President is in a position 
to defend the Constitution and not the Court. Whereas, on the other hand, in 1928, 
Hans Kelsen argued that only a Constitutional Court would be in a position to defend 
the Constitution. In addition to this key debate, Schmitt and Kelsen have examined 
further and more peripheral issues, nonetheless these examinations are and remain 
still valuable.
Only the passing of time resolved these theoretical differences with practical 
consequences for the judicial and constitutional adjudication. This happened only after 
a human catastrophe brought by the second world war. Developments followed as 
had Hans Kelsen predicted. The chief of state, in the majority of states today, plays an 
instrumental role in the protection of constitution through exercising of authorizations 
of the passive side of powers. This does not occur in all constitutional democracies, 
rather only in cases of a parliamentary constitutional system. However, it does not 
follow that the monopoly of defending the constitution rests with the chief of state, as 
a constitutional justice in a broad sense. That monopoly rests with another institution, 
separated from the other powers, which usually is not part of the judiciary, that is, the 
Constitutional Court.6 We can deduce from this that because of the events of the past 
century which divest the figure of the President by showing his ego and at the same 
time by weakening his role as a potential guarantor of constitutionality through his 
exercising of his competencies, the role of protection of the constitution is attributed 
only to the Constitutional Court.
Despite this very thoughtful debate, which embodies the relationship between the 
President and the Constitutional Court, in a constitutional and practical sense it can be 
concluded that both these institutions have constitutional mandates to be guarantors 
of the constitutionality and guardians of the Constitutions, but the procedure to 
achieve this differs. Whereas the Constitutional Court achieves this through a judicial 
procedure of adjudicating on the constitutional and legal norms, on the other hand, in 
the President’s case we can witness the presence of the political element, which in many 
cases is misused and abused, especially in places where the President by calling upon 
his constitutional competences turns himself into a dictator.7 However, in democratic 
5 (Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law) Lars Vinx-The Guardian of the Constitution_ Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt on the 
Limits of Constitutional Law-Cambridge University Press (2015), pages 50-160.
6 Law – Journal for Juridical and Social Issues, Enver Hasani: Preventive Abstract Control of Constitutional Amendments and 
Protection of the Head of State from Unconstitutional- Dismissal: The Case of Kosovo, USAID, Prishtina, pages 105-150. 
7 If we take for example former communist states, which in their constitutional systems have adopted a strong President, who 
often would misuse his competences, by not exercising them democratically and with the purpose of ensuring the functioning and 
guaranteeing of a decent constitutional order. A typical case which proves such an attitude is Albania, which in the Constitutional 
Law of 1992 had designed a strong President, which later proved to be a wrong solution.
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states with functional constitutional systems, the guaranteeing and protection of the 
Constitution and of constitutionality can be considered as a responsibility exercised by 
both the President and the Constitutional Court.
Constitutions of democratic states have embodied remarkably the report between the 
President and the Constitutional Court, by creating independent mechanisms for these 
two constitutional institutions through which they guarantee the constitutionality 
and protect the Constitution. Besides this, the constitutions of democratic states have 
designed such mechanisms, through which the President in cooperation with the 
Constitutional Court guarantee the functioning and protection of the Constitution and 
constitutionalism.8
Such design of the report between the President and the Constitutional Court has 
been adopted also by the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, from which the 
constitutional system of Kosovo derives. This report will be examined in details below.
Report between the Constitutional Court and the President in the Constitution 
of Republic of Kosovo
The constitutional system of Kosovo, stemming from the Constitution which is in force 
since 2008, has designed a typical and common relation between the President and 
the Constitutional Court. Generally, such adoptions have been contained and designed 
by other constitutions as well. We have to examine this report in the constitutional 
system of Kosovo by identifying and analyzing the case law and the exercise of their 
respective power by these two institutions to clarify the report beyond what is written 
in the Constitution. That said, this section looks at some practical elements which 
characterize the report between the President and the Constitutional Court.
Taking the constitutional norms as a starting point, the Constitution of Kosovo, in the 
provision in which in regulates the separation of powers, it has defined the role of the 
President and of the Constitutional Court9. In this case, in the said article refers to the 
separation of powers where the President is the representative of the unity of the 
people, represents the country internally and externally and finally, is a guarantor of 
the democratic functioning of the institutions, emphasizing these three key attributions 
that a President has in a constitutional system. In the same article the Constitutional 
Court is said to be the institution that protects the constitutionality and providing the 
final interpretation of the Constitution10. It seems that the way this constitutional norm 
8 Constitution of Croatia article 89, Constitution of Polant articles 122.3 and 144.3.9, Constitution of Hungary article 9.3, Constitution 
of Albania article 134, Constitution of Macedonia article 84, Constitution of of Slovenia and Constitution of Montenegro on the 
report between the President and the Constitutional Court refer also to the institute of discharging the President.
9 Constitution of Kosovo, article 4.
10 Ibid., article 4, para 3 and 6. (3) The President of the Republic of Kosovo represents the unity of the people. The President of 
the Republic of Kosovo is the legitimate representative of the country, internally and - 2 - externally, and is the guarantor of the 
democratic functioning of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, as provided in this Constitution. (6) The Constitutional Court 
is an independent organ in protecting the constitutionality and is the final interpreter of the Constitution.
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has been drafted, is a reflection of Schmitt’s and Kelsen’s theory for the powers of 
the President and the Constitutional Court respectively. There is no dilemma that the 
President and the Constitutional Court have two separate functions even though both 
these institutions through various mechanisms serve as regulators in a constitutional 
system of a country, in this case of Kosovo’s. It follows naturally that the role of the 
Constitutional Court as a regulator and protector of constitutionality in a country, 
like in Kosovo is achieved by being a final interpreter of the constitutional and legal 
norms, in a constitutional and legal process, without and political element, as Kelsen 
suggests. On the other hand, the President has constitutional authorizations to serve 
as a regulator and guarantor of the democratic function of the institutions, including 
ensuring the constitutionality. However, this is achieved by means of a process which 
differs from that of the Constitutional Court and which can include political elements 
into the decision making process, as suggests Schmitt11. These competences and the 
means by which they are exercised, provide the President with the opportunity of 
being a neutral actor in the public and constitutional life in the Republic of Kosovo, by 
utilizing the President’s competences.
Let’s return at the main theme of this paper, the report between the President and 
the Constitutional Court in the Constitution of Kosovo, where this report has two 
dimensions. First, what lies and is provided by the constitutional norm and second, 
the way what is provided by the constitution is implemented and exercised in practice. 
That said, there are three key issues which identify the report between the President 
and the Constitutional Court within the constitutional system of Kosovo. One is 
the competence of the President in appointing and discharging the judges of the 
Constitutional Court, which creates a report demonstrating that only the President is 
empowered with the right to appoint the individuals which shall protect and interpret 
the constitution. This competence of the President, prima facie, appears to be only 
formal, but this should be further analyzed below. Second, the report between the 
Constitutional Court and the President is expressed also through the discharging 
of the President, where the Constitutional Court is mandated to conclude whether 
the President has violated the Constitution12. This way the Constitutional Court has 
considered two cases of this nature, where in one it had ruled that the President, 
his excellency Fatmir Sejdiu, had committed a serious violation of the Constitution13. 
In the other, the Constitutional Court had ruled that the procedure for the election 
11 Article 84 lists the authorizations of the President of Kosovo where it is clear that the majority of the competences of the 
President aim at fulfilling the attributes mentioned above, i.e., representing the unity of the people and guaranteeing the 
democratic functioning of the institutions. E.g., review the laws of the Kosovo Parliament, propose constitutional amendments, 
refer issues to the Constitutional Court, mandate the candidate for Prime Minister, appoint and discharge judges, prosecutors, 
chief prosecutor, President of the Supreme Court, Judges of the Constitutional Court, appoint leaders of national security 
institutions, appoint leaders of independent institutions.
12 Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, article 91, para. 3. 
13 Case Nr. KL.47/10, Naim Rrustemi and 31 members of Kosovo Parliament v. His Excellency Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu, President of 
Kosovo, 28 September 2010.
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of the President had been unconstitutional14. In the first case, the Constitutional 
Court has clarified the importance of the political element of a President, ruling it 
as nonconforming with the Constitution for a President to hold the function of the 
President and a function on a political party. This tendency seems to be against Schmitt’s 
thesis, which as we saw above, suggests that the President may be a guarantor of the 
Constitution. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, in relation to the 
report between the President and a political party, i.e., whether a President may hold 
a post in a political party, has clarified that this rule is only applicable to the President 
but not to the Acting President15.
Outside this issue we have to agree that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court of Kosovo, for all the years in its existence, through its judgments has dealt 
with in detail about the constitutional function of the President16. These judgments 
have served as a source for discussions and scholarly debates among jurists and the 
academic community17.
In addition to the two above mentioned aspects in which the report between the 
President and the Constitutional Court is reflected, one other important aspect is the 
competence of the President to refer issues to the Constitutional Court. Indeed, this 
may represent the key point of the constitutional report between the President and 
the Constitutional Court in Kosovo, if we take into account the constitutional role of 
the President in guaranteeing the constitutionality and democratic functioning of the 
institutions, as well as the representation of the unity of the people. We find this 
competence of the President in most of the constitutional systems of the world. In 
Kosovo’s case, this competence is found in two forms. First, as part of the special 
and original jurisdiction18.Second, as part of the general jurisdiction, as a competence 
of the President19. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo has treated this competence 
following the second form, in cases when it has ruled over the admissibility of requests 
by the President on this basis20.
14 Case Nr. KO 29/1, Sabri Hamiti and other members of Kosovo Parliament on examination of the constitutionality of the Decision 
of the Kosovo Parliament Nr. 04-V-04, related to the election of the President of the Republic of Kosovo, 22 February 2011.
15 Case Nr. KO 97/10 on the request submitted by the Acting President, Dr. Jakup Krasniqi related to the issue of holding the 
position of Acting President at the same time of the function of General Secretary of Democratic Party of Kosovo.
16 The following are cases in which the Constitutional Court examines and clarifies through a Judgments the constitutional role of 
a President, including his or her role in representing the unity of the people and guaranteeing the democratic functioning of the 
institutions: Case KO 29/12 and Case KO 48/12 Proposed Constitutional Amendments, submitted by the President of the Kosovo 
Parliament on 23 March 2012 and 4 May 2012.
17 The contents of this judgment has been examined and challenged also by Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani. See further: Law – Journal for 
Juridical and Social Issues, Enver Hasani: Preventive Abstract Control of Constitutional Amendments and Protection of the Head 
of State from Unconstitutional- Dismissal: The Case of Kosovo, USAID, Prishtina, pages 105-150.
18 Constitution of Kosovo, Article 113, para. 2-3.
19 Ibid, article 84, para. 9.
20 Case Nr. K0103/14, President of Republic of Kosovo on the examination of conformity of article 84 (14) [Competences of the 
President] with article 95 [Election of Government] of Constitution of Kosovo. See in particular the part on the admissibility of 
the request.
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The Constitution of Kosovo differs the functions of the President and the Constitutional 
Court in such as way as each of these institutions has a general constitutional function21, 
which is materialized in specific articles22. Based on what was said above, in order to 
clarify the report between the President and the Constitutional Court in more detail, 
we have to take into account that both these institutions are considered as neutral 
institutions, but separate ones. Concretely, the competence of the President to refer 
issues to the Constitutional Court, enables for the joint exercise of the function of both 
institutions to guarantee and protect the constitutional system of Kosovo.
The opportunity for the President to refer cases to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo 
has been proven to be a useful tool, as it has been used by the President indirectly 
to enable the democratic functioning of the institutions by means of a process of 
interpretation of the Constitution, by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo.
Such convergence of the function of the President to refer cases to the Constitutional 
Court and an interpretation of the Constitutional Court for a concrete issue that is 
referred by the President seems to be an ideal solution to guarantee a functional 
constitutional system. Despite of other competences of the President of Kosovo to 
guarantee the constitutional and democratic functioning of the institutions, it has been 
proven in practice that when the President of Kosovo has used the competence to refer 
cases to the Constitutional Court, everything has been clearer and the Constitutional 
Court has provided more trust and legal security.
This point of the report between these two constitutional institutions safeguards and 
contributes to a functional constitutional system, the protection of the constitution 
and of constitutionality. Often, the President cannot manage the functioning of 
the constitutional system, in particular in cases which in and of themselves require 
constitutional interpretations. As such in order for the President to reflect faith in cases 
of doubts over the inclusion of any political elements in the President’s decision making, 
the same is activated through the competence to refer cases to the Constitutional 
Court, to clarify a particular issue for the purpose of ensuring constitutionality. One 
such situation has occurred in Kosovo during the institutional crisis of 2014 which has 
lasted for months.
We are not able to fully understand the impact of this report in the functioning of 
the constitutional system in Kosovo, as unfortunately the Presidents of Kosovo 
thus far have not produced that many cases in the Constitutional Court, to clarify 
concrete constitutional situations. In all the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court 
of Kosovo we are able to find only four cases referred by Kosovo’s Presidents thus 
far, by utilizing the competence of the President to refer cases to the Constitutional 
21 Constitution of Kosovo, article 4.
22 Comparing article 4 with article 84 and 113 of the Constitution reflects that the general constitutional jurisdiction is materialized 
with concrete competences.
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Court. In the first case, the President of Kosovo, his excellency Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu has 
asked the Constitutional Court to clarify the issue of resignation of the Mayer of 
Rahovec Municipality Mr. Qazim Qeska23. On the other hand, the President of Kosovo, 
her excellency Madame Atifete Jahjaga has asked the Constitutional Court to rule on 
whether the Assembly of Kosovo has violated her right to veto the Law Nr. 04/1-084 
on Pensions of the members of the Kosovo Security Force24.
We will not be analyzing these two cases, but we have to emphasize that the 
Constitutional Court has in both cases, as in other cases as well, argued in details 
over the issues asked. Further, the most known case which relates to the exercise of 
the competence to refer cases to the Constitutional Court by the President has been 
submitted in 2014, in which case the President of Kosovo, her excellency Madame 
Atifete Jahjaga has asked the Constitutional Court questions of constitutional nature, 
to examine the conformity of article 84.14 with article 95 of the Constitution, for the 
purpose of clarifying who is entitled to propose the mandate holder for the formation 
of Government25. Indeed, before the referral of this case to the Constitutional Court 
by President Jahjaga, scholarly and political debates have been taking place over who 
is entitled to establish the government following the 2014 elections which created the 
necessity for coalition between political parties. The President, facing public pressure 
because of the blockade of the state institutions, to avoid any dilemmas from her 
decision making process, as it was her competence to mandate a candidate for Prime 
Minister, the President asked the Constitutional Court for this issue. A professional, 
objective and fully independent interpretation of the Constitutional Court enabled the 
clarification of the issue and avoiding any and all dilemmas.
The second most important case, which has produced heated political debate26 and 
which has instigated protests by the opposition is the case of Association of Serb Majority 
Municipalities, an agreement signed between the Republic of Kosovo and Republic of 
Serbia in Brussels, in Agust 201527. The contents of this agreement by the public and 
academic community was classified as containing provisions in nonconformity with 
the constitution28. Such a determination produced protests and blocked the work of 
23 Case Nr KO 80/10 Request of the President of Kosovo, his excellency Dr. Fatmir Sejdiu, on clarifying the competences of the 
President in the case of the Mayor of Rahovec, Mr. Qazim Qeska.
24 Case Nr. KO 57/12 Request of the President of Kosovo, her excellency Atifete Jahjaga, on the effects of the right to veto of the 
President related to the voting and approving in Parliament after a veto of Law Nr. 04/1-084 on Pensions of Members of the 
Kosovo Security Force.
25 Case Nr. KO 103/14, Request of the President of Kosovo, her excellency Atifete Jahjaga on the examination of the conformity of 
article 84(14) [Competences of the President] with article 95 [Election of Government] of the Constitution of Kosovo.
26 It refers to the political debate occurring in national media over the last five months of 2015., between analysts and members 
of political parties, related to the contents of the Agreement on the Principles of the Association of Serb Majority Municipality.
27 See e.g., http://botasot.info/lajme/445144/nis-takimi-mustafa-mogherini/, accessed on 04.01.2016.
28 Public and academic opinion in the context of this paper means the debate and opinions offered in national and international 
media of university professors and jurists as well as other opinion makers. These debates have been going on for the last five 
months of 2015 related to the issue of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities.
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the Kosovo Parliament for months from the date signing this agreement. The President 
of Republic of Kosovo, Mrs. Jahjaga, as a representative of the unity of the people and 
a guarantor of the democratic functioning of the institutions, after failed attempts of 
political dialogue between the position and opposition, utilized her competence and 
referred the signed agreement for examination by the Constitutional Court, by means 
of a constitutional question. The President achieved this, by utilizing the competence 
of the President to refer issues to the Constitutional Court and through this the 
President ensured the safeguarding of the constitutional and democratic functioning 
of the institutions and represented the unity of the people. Further and finally the 
President safeguarded the constitutional order, from anti constitutional elements of a 
particular legal act, such as the agreement on the principles of the Association of Serb 
Majority Municipalities29.
The Role of the President in appointing Constitutional Judges 
In examining the report between the Constitutional Court and the President, we have 
to look at the role and competences of the latter in in the process of appointment of 
the judges of the Constitutional Court.
Many constitutions have designed various models of the involvement of the 
President in the process of appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court. The 
determination of this role of the President, takes into account the role of the President 
as a representative of the unity of the people and of executive powers, which the 
President has based on the Constitution.
By analyzing the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, we can see the positioning 
of the President in relation to this process, i.e., the appointment of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court as a position of final nature in the decision-making process. The 
Constitution has foreseen that the President shall conclude such an important process 
by finalizing the appointment of the judges proposed by the Kosovo Parliament, 
with a decree for their appointment. This position of the President, as final in this 
process, comes from the competence of the President, to guarantee the constitutional 
functioning of the institutions foreseen by the Constitution30. This means that the 
Presidents offers the guarantees for a constitutional process of appointment of the 
judges of the Constitutional Court, by means of the decree with which the President 
concludes this process.
What is the concrete role that the Constitution has appointed to the President in this 
process. If we refer to the Constitution of Kosovo, we shall see that it is silent, on 
whether the President for any reasons, can refuse the final appointment by a decree 
of the judges of Constitutional Court, which have been proposed by Kosovo Parliament 
29 Judgment in case Nr. K0130/15, dated 23.12.2015.
30 Constitution of Republic of Kosovo, article 84, para. 2.
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by a qualified majority vote of 2/3 of all the members of the Assembly that are present 
and voting31. The Law on Constitutional Court has dealt with in more detail with this 
report between the President and the Constitutional Court, by specifying in which 
cases the President may not respect the proposal of the Kosovo Parliament, by not 
finally appointing the judges of the Constitutional Court which are proposed by the 
Parliament. This way, the law has foreseen, that candidates which have been political 
affiliation in the past, such as holding a function in a political party, the President may 
not appoint such proposal, until such candidates do not convince the President by 
sufficient proofs that they have resigned from any responsibility or function in any 
political party or political organization32.
This law specifies only one aspect of compliance, which is the political independence 
of the candidate proposed by the Kosovo Parliament. It is unclear to understand what 
would be the role of the President, if faced with a candidate, for whom the President is 
reserved as to his or her professional qualifications or moral integrity of the candidate, 
for which even the law does not provide guidance. Generally, the conclusion that the 
President’s competence for the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court is 
just formal remains true, as the President has no discretion to refuse the proposals by 
the Kosovo Parliament, at least not based on the law. It remains unsolved whether the 
President’s discretion in particular cases may exceed the legal requirements33.
A debate over the President’s position in the process of appointment of judges of 
the Constitutional Court was held in the Republic of Slovakia. There, the Constitution 
has designed the President as a constitutional authority, to appoint the judges of the 
Constitutional Court.34
In the second year of the mandate of President Kiska, the Parliament of the Republic 
of Slovakia, in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution, has made the 
proposal to the President for members of the Constitutional Court. The Constitution 
of Slovakia, provides that the President selects the candidates from a group proposed 
by the Parliament. The number is always twice as the number of free positions. 
However, the Constitution of Slovakia does not offer guidance on how to continue if 
the President fails to select the candidates or based on what criteria can the President 
ask the Parliament to submit more nominations or candidates. In this case, from six (6) 
proposals made by the Parliament for three (3) vacant positions, President Ksika has 
appointed only one (1) judge, leaving two (2) vacant positions in the Constitutional 
Court.
31 Ibid, article 114, para. 2. 
32 Law on Constitutional Court, article 5, para. 3.
33 Decree of the President of Republic of Kosovo, of date 30.12.2015 for the appointment of Mrs. Gresa Caka-Nimani and 
Mrs. Selvete Gerxhaliu as judges of the Constitutional Court was the last case in which the President of Kosovo approved the 
proposals of the Kosovo Parliament.
34 Constitution of Republic of Slovakia, article 10, para. 1., point “s”.
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Three of the judges not appointed lodged an appeal to the Constitutional Court 
against the decision of President Kiska, for not appointing the candidates for all vacant 
positions, alleging that the President, by this act, had violated the Constitution and 
had not fulfilled the President’s constitutional obligations.
The Constitutional Court has decided that President Kiska has violated the rights of 
judges Eva Fulcová, Juraj Sopoliga and Miroslav Duris. The Constitutional Court at the 
same time has annulled the respective decision of Kiska to refuse the candidates of 
2 July 2014 and had order the President to deal with this issue again. Moreover, the 
Office of the President has been ordered to pay the three judges their expenses related 
to legal proceedings. (See further case: Eva Fulcová, Juraj Sopoliga and Miroslav Duris 
v. President Kiska).
The case of the decision of the Constitutional Court of Slovakia, by not clarifying 
the role of the President, over the right to return the appointment of judges of the 
Constitutional Court in the Parliament, demonstrates one more time, the complexity 
of the reports of the President not only with the Constitutional Court, but also with 
the Parliament.
In conclusion, although the constitutional system of Kosovo and the Constitution of 
Kosovo have designed a President fully independent, with a considerate number of 
authorizations which enable the President’s neutrality and his role as a guarantor of 
the democratic functioning of institutions. However, the cooperation of the President 
with the Constitutional Court assists and enables the President to fully realize his 
authorizations which aim at guaranteeing the democratic functioning of the institutions. 
These two important institutions as separate institutions, but also in cooperation with 
one another play an important role in the functioning of the constitutional system, by 
complementing each other, in particular in cases of constitutional crisis.
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